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New	electoral	systems	and	old	referendums	
July	31	2018	
Gabrielle	Demange1	
	
	
Abstract	
I	discuss	the	future	of	electoral	systems’	design.	Two	routes	are	worth	investigating.	First,	new	
voting	procedures	can	be	designed	and	implemented	due	to	new	computing	and	communication	
facilities.	 I	 illustrate	with	 two	positive	 recent	 experiments	 in	 France	 and	 Switzerland.	 Second,	
the	well-known	old	referendum	needs	to	be	investigated	more	thoroughly,	especially	because	it	
is	being	increasingly	popular	in	a	variety	of	situations.	I	discuss	some	issues	and	directions	for	
its	improvement.	
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Introduction	
	
With	 the	 development	 of	 computing	 and	 communication	 facilities,	 the	 approaches	 of	 social	
choice	and	game	theories	are	being	used	to	design	and	implement	rules	in	a	large	and	growing	
number	of	areas	such	as	market	design,	assignment	mechanisms,	recommendation	systems	and	
rating	procedures	on	Internet,	or	electoral	systems.	I	focus	here	on	the	latter.		
	
Changing	an	electoral	system	is	presumably	more	difficult	than	setting	new	venues	of	exchanges	
or	 allocation	 mechanisms.	 Though,	 promising	 experiments	 allowing	 for	 a	 broader	 and	 fairer	
voters’	expression	than	the	current	rules	are	being	conducted.	I	describe	two	of	them	in	Section	
1.	At	the	same	time,	I	have	been	struck	–as	many	others-	by	recent	voting	events	such	as	the	EU	
referendum	in	UK,	2016	(the	so-called	Brexit).	In	Section	2,	I	first	discuss	the	UK	process	in	light	
of	 social	 choice	 theory	and	 the	surveys	and	statistical	analysis	 that	have	been	conducted	after	
the	 vote;	 I	 then	 consider	 some	 issues	 that	 could	 be	 investigated	 to	 improve	 the	 use	 of	
referendums.		
1.	Changing	the	electoral	system:	two	experiments		
	
A	set	of	experiments	has	been	conducted	in	France	to	assess	the	acceptance	of	new	systems	for	
electing	 the	 French	 President.	 The	 current	 system	 is	 a	 two-round	 vote.	 According	 to	 polls,	
several	 times,	 a	 Condorcet	 winner	 has	 been	 eliminated	 in	 the	 first	 round.	 There	 is	 a	 call	 for	
changing	 the	 system	 to	 remedy	 this	 drawback	 as	 well	 as	 to	 allow	 for	 a	 more	 nuanced	 and	
broader	voters’	expression.	 In	particular,	experiments	have	been	conducted	to	test	how	voters	
understand	and	accept	new	voting	rules.	The	 first	experiments	tested	approval	voting	 in	2002	
‘in	 situ’	 in	 a	number	of	 selected	voting	posts	 (see	 the	account	 in	Laslier	 and	Van	der	Straeten	
2008).	 	 In	 the	selected	posts,	voters	could	vote	under	approval	voting	 if	 they	wanted	 to	 (after	
receiving	some	explanation	on	the	rule).	These	votes	had	no	influence	on	the	electoral	outcome	
as	voters	also	cast	their	vote	to	the	‘real’	election.	The	test	was	successful	in	the	sense	that	the	
participation	 was	 large.	 Other	 rules	 -Borda	 scores	 and	 majority	 judgment-	 have	 been	 tested	
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recently,	 taking	advantage	of	Internet.2		These	experiments	are	encouraging,	as	they	reveal	the	
interest	and	concern	for	voting	rules	of	both	the	population	and	media.	
	
The	second	experiment,	conducted	in	Switzerland,	is	a	real	one.	During	a	trial	period	starting	in	
2004,	a	new	method		-hereafter	called	the	New	Apportionment	Procedure-	has	been	used	in	the	
Zurich	canton	to	allocate	seats	to	parties	and	districts.	The	method	is	now	definitely	adopted	in	
the	Zurich	canton	and	some	other	cantons	as	well.	The	main	motive	for	changing	the	system	was	
to	offer	a	solution	to	 the	problem	of	 `lost	ballots',	which	was	highlighted	 in	2002	by	 the	Swiss	
Federal	Court.	In	small	districts,	the	low	number	of	seats	did	not	give	any	chance	to	small	parties	
to	obtain	a	seat.	As	a	result,	some	supporters	of	small	parties	complained:		their	votes	were	lost	
and,	 furthermore,	 they	were	 not	 treated	 on	 an	 equal	 footing	with	 the	 supporters	 of	 the	 same	
parties	in	larger	districts	in	which	the	number	of	seats	at	stake	enabled	their	representation.	Of	
course,	 some	 ballots	 are	 necessarily	 lost	 in	 an	 election,	 those	 in	 favor	 of	 a	 looser.	 It	 was	 the	
‘unfair’	treatment	of	supporters	of	the	same	party	that	triggered	the	reform.	
	
The	 problem	 of	 lost	 ballots	 arises	 in	 a	 large	 number	 of	 elections	 for	 the	 representatives	 of	
distinct	areas	in	an	assembly.	Such	elections	entail	two	dimensions,	a	geographical	one	linked	to	
areas	 (districts	 in	 Switzerland	 or	 countries	 in	 EU)	 and	 a	 political	 one	 linked	 to	 parties.	 A	
representation	is	called	bi-apportionment	to	refer	to	these	two	dimensions.	In	many	instances,	
the	allocation	of	seats	to	areas	is	pre-determined.	When	the	sizes	of	the	areas	widely	differ,	as	is	
the	case	for	districts	in	Switzerland	or	countries	in	EU,	small	areas	obtain	fewer	seats	than	the	
large	ones	 so	 that	 there	are	 lost	ballots.	Ballots	are	 lost	 even	 though	 the	allocation	of	 seats	 to	
areas	is	distorted	in	favor	of	small	areas,	meaning	that	the	ratios	of	the	number	of	assigned	seats	
to	 population	 size	 decrease	 in	 the	 size.	 The	 distortion	 can	 be	 huge.	 To	 illustrate,	 in	 the	 EU	
parliament	as	of	2017,	 the	 largest	ratios	are	those	 for	Luxembourg	and	Malta,	which	are	more	
than	11	times	those	for	Germany,	France,	Spain	and	UK.	This	distortion	raises	a	new	issue:	the	
parties’	representation	is	distorted	as	soon	as	the	votes	for	parties	are	not	proportional	across	
areas	between	each	other.	In	other	words,	the	distortion	in	the	geographical	allocation	of	seats	
induces	a	distortion	in	the	political	representation.	In	particular,	a	proportional	representation	
of	the	parties	is	far	from	being	feasible	when	the	seats	to	parties	are	determined	in	an	area	on	
the	basis	of	the	votes	obtained	in	that	area	only,	independently	of	the	votes	in	the	other	areas.	In	
some	 countries,	 electoral	 rules	 try	 to	 correct	 distortions	 by	 introducing	 cumbersome	 features	
such	as	a	variable	number	of	seats,	resulting	in	‘bugs’	as	in	Italy	and	Germany.3			
	
Such	 flaws	 are	 corrected	 by	 bi-divisor	methods,	 introduced	 in	 Balinski	 and	Demange	 (1989-a	
and	b).	At	that	time,	I	doubted	that	the	methods	would	be	used	for	real	political	elections,	mainly	
because	 they	 are	 not	 computable	 by	 hand.	 Despite	 these	 difficulties,	 the	 New	 Apportionment	
Procedure	(NAP)	in	Zurich	is	based	on	such	a	method.		Pukelsheim	(2006)	made	a	tremendous	
job	 by	 implementing	 the	 procedure	 and	 obtaining	 the	 support	 of	 the	 politicians	 and	 the	
population,	who	accepted	the	NAP	by	referendum.	Roughly	speaking,	a	bi-divisor	method	works	
as	follows:	the	votes	are	adjusted	by	‘divisors’,	one	for	each	party	and	one	for	each	district,	and	
then	 rounded	 up	 to	 obtain	 the	 number	 of	 seats	 of	 each	 party	 in	 each	 district.	 Divisors	 thus	
introduce	a	link	between	the	votes	in	different	areas,	thereby	avoiding	lost	ballots,	while	keeping	
the	prescribed	allocation	of	seats	 to	districts.	They	are	necessary	because	of	 the	distortions	 in	
the	allocation	of	seats	to	districts	and	(to	a	lower	extent)	the	indivisibility	in	the	seats.	Although	
the	outcome	is	not	computable	by	hand,	voters	can	easily	check	it	once	they	know	the	divisors.	
This	might	explain	why	the	NAP	was	adopted	by	referendum	in	Zurich.4	
																																																								
2For	experiments	conducted		in	the	2017	presidential	election,	see		‘Voter	autrement’	
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electoral	systems	in	various	countries,	see	Simeone	and	Pukelsheim	(2006).		
4The	bi-divisor	methods	could	be	applied	in	other	contexts	than	the	political	one.			
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These	experiments	are	promising:	voters	are	open	to	changes	in	voting	systems	and	new	rules	
can	 be	 defined	 with	 the	 help	 of	 computing	 facilities.	 Designing	 new	 voting	 procedures	 is	
definitely	a	promising	line	of	research	for	social	choice	theory.	
	
I	now	turn	to	one	of	the	oldest	rules,	the	referendum.	
2.	Referendums	
	
The	number	of	referendums	has	increased	in	Western	Europe	(for	an	analysis	of	this	trend	and	a	
classification	 of	 referendums,	 see	 e.g.	 Setala	 1999).	 One	 factor	 explaining	 this	 trend	 is	 the	
evolution	 of	 the	 EU:	 proposed	 changes	 such	 as	 enlargement	 or	 new	 constitution	 trigger	
referendums	in	many	countries	due	to	their	constitutional	rules.	Another	factor	put	forward	by	
political	 scientists	 would	 be	 related	 to	 citizens’	 preferences,	 specifically	 to	 the	 ‘unfreezing’	 of	
alignments,	according	to	which	voters	no	longer	‘belong’	to	a	party.	Misalignments	could	explain	
why	 voters	 may	 not	 want	 to	 delegate	 all	 decisions	 to	 their	 representatives	 and	 increasingly	
demand	 referendums	 on	 specific	 topics	 (as	 revealed	 in	 surveys,	 see	Donovan	 and	Karp	 2006,	
Bowler,	Donovan	and	Karp	2007).5	
	
From	the	point	of	view	of	social	choice	theory,	the	referendum	setting,	in	which	people	choose	
between	 two	 alternatives,	 works	 well	 for	 aggregating	 either	 preferences	 or	 dispersed	
information.	When	individuals	differ	only	in	their	preferences,	the	majority	rule	is	well	defined	
and	 strategy-proof.	 	 When	 they	 share	 the	 same	 preferences	 but	 are	 uncertain	 as	 to	 which	
alternative	is	preferred,	the	majority	rule	is	more	likely	than	each	single	individual	to	select	the	
correct	alternative	if	votes	are	sincere	(the	Condorcet	jury	theorem).		
	
Various	 works	 have	 scrutinized	 these	 positive	 results.	 The	 Condorcet	 jury	 theorem	 has	 been	
challenged	because	 sincere	voting	might	not	 constitute	an	equilibrium	behavior	under	private	
information,	 resulting	 in	 a	 biased	 outcome	 (Austen-Smith	 and	 Banks	 1996).	 The	 argument	
however	 relies	 on	 rather	 sophisticated	 voters,	 and	 has	 not	 much	 bite	 when	 the	 electorate	 is	
large	with	 no	 pivotal	 player	 (see	 e.g.	 Laslier	 and	Weibull	 2013).	 Another	 criticism	 is	 that	 the	
reality	 is	 more	 complex	 than	 the	 two	 polar	 cases	 described	 above,	 mixing	 heterogeneity	 in	
preferences	and	private	information	on	the	alternatives.	Also,	it	has	been	known	for	a	long	time	
that	 voters	 may	 not	 answer	 the	 question	 but	 rather	 signal	 their	 mistrust	 in	 the	 current	
authorities	or	communicate	on	a	different	issue.6	So	what	about	the	EU	referendum	in	UK,	2016?	
How	does	the	social	choice	analysis	guide	our	understanding?	 
The	EU	referendum	in	UK,	2016	
	
Many	 think	 that	 something	 went	 wrong.	 Let	 us	 first	 remark	 that	 the	 mistrust	 in	 Cameron	
government	 does	 not	 seem	 to	 have	 played	 an	 important	 role	 in	 the	 vote,	 as	 shown	 in	 the	
references	 in	 footnote	 7.	 Consider	 now	 sophisticated	 voting	 induced	 by	 private	 information.	
Assuming	 information	 to	 have	 been	 determinant	 in	 the	 votes	 and	 applying	 Austen-Smith	 and	
Banks	argument,	the	result	would	have	been	biased	if,	knowing	that	Leave	had	a	chance	to	win,	a	
voter	 thought	 that	 the	proponents	of	Leave	had	an	 information	of	better	quality	 than	 those	of	
Remain.	But	detailed	analyses	show7	that	votes	were	mainly	dictated	by	education,	age,	ethnicity	
																																																								
5These	works	refer	to	referendums	at	the	national	level.	There	is	also	an	increasing	demand	for	
participatory	democracy	at	the	local	level.		
6	See,	e.g.,	Piketty	(2000).		
7	http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-38762034#share-tools,		
	https://www.economist.com/news/britain/21720576-migration-good-economy-so-why-are-
places-biggest-influxes-doing-so		and	Becker,	Fetzer	and		Novy	(2017)	
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and	recent	changes	 in	 immigration	in	their	area,	all	of	which	determine	preferences.	Of	course	
this	does	not	mean	that	information	did	not	matter,	but	probably	not	private	information.	
	
The	referendum	was	incredibly	ill	prepared	with	an	electorate	under	fundamental	uncertainty.	
The	overall	consequences	are	still	to	be	interpreted’	as	stated	in	The	six	flavours	of	Brexit’,	The	
Economist,	22	July	2017.	As	analyses	in	mid	2017	indicate,8	a	large	majority	would	prefer	a	‘soft’	
Brexit,	 suggesting	 that	 the	 question	 was	 not	 well	 formulated.	 Though,	 overall,	 the	 EU	
referendum	 seems	 to	 have	 worked	 well	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 it	 has	 correctly	 aggregated	 voters’	
preferences.	This	is	supported	by	the	surveys,	which	indicate	that	Leave	would	have	still	won	a	
few	months	 after	 the	 referendum.9	Furthermore,	most	 of	 those	who	 voted	 Remain	 accept	 the	
result	and	do	not	want	a	second	vote.10		
	
Has	 social	 choice	 theory	 something	 to	 add,	 apart	 from	 the	 obvious	 facts	 that	 a	 referendum	
should	be	prepared	and	 the	electorate	should	vote	under	a	clear	picture	of	 the	consequences?	
Given	 the	 trend	 towards	 an	 extensive	 use	 of	 referendums,	 and	 more	 generally	 towards	
participative	democracy,	there	are	open	issues	worth	investigating.		
	
How	to	revisit	referendums?		
	
How	can	the	use	of	referendums	be	improved?	By	its	very	definition,	a	referendum	is	simple:	it	
applies	 to	a	set	of	voters	who	 face	a	binary	decision,	 typically	 the	status	quo	against	a	reform.		
Despite	 its	 simplicity,	 a	 variety	 of	 options	 pertaining	 to	 its	 organization	 and	 design	 have	 not	
been	much	investigated	in	social	choice	theory.	Here	are	a	few	ones:11	
	
Who	is	allowed	to	vote?		
Most	of	the	studies	start	with	‘Let	N	be	the	set	of	voters’.	The	problem	of	a	changing	electorate	is	
accounted	for	in	studies	in	public	goods	by	the	‘Voting	with	their	feet’	made	famous	by	Tiebout,	
which	reflects	a	rather	extreme	form	of	voting.	The	design	of	an	electorate	has	not	been	much	
analyzed	 from	 a	 normative	 point	 of	 view	 (as	 far	 as	 I	 know).	 Due	 to	 the	 increased	mobility	 of	
people,	this	issue	is	becoming	increasingly	important,	especially	in	the	decisions	bearing	on	the	
splitting	 or	 merging	 of	 populations.	The	 Scottish	 independence	 referendum	 in	 2014	 and	 the	
votes	for	independence	in	Cataluña	in	2014	and	2017	adopted	very	different	participation	rules	
than	 the	 EU	 referendum	 in	 UK,	 2016.	 Should	 the	 rule	 determining	 the	 electorate	 of	 such	
referendums	be	defined	more	precisely	ex	ante?	And	how?	
	
Which	information	on	the	reform	is	available?		
To	help	voters	assess	properly	the	issue	at	stake	and	to	incentivize	the	proponents	or	opponents	
of	a	reform	to	provide	accurate	and	relevant	information	on	its	consequences,	the	period	before	
the	 referendum	 is	 crucial.	 Politicians,	 standard	media	or	 social	networks	provide	 information.	
Information	 from	voters	 can	also	be	elicited	by	 introducing	 sequential	or	 iterative	procedures	
(keeping	 in	mind	 that	 incentive	properties	 are	 altered).	One	possibility	 suggested	 to	me	by	K.	
Nehring	is	to	organize	a	first	round	bearing	on	whether	a	referendum	should	be	organized	on	a	
given	 issue.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 UK,	 if	 the	 first	 round	 vote	 on	 contemplating	 exiting	 EU	 had	 been	
																																																								
8 http://uk.businessinsider.com/yougov-british-people-have-turned-against-a-hard-brexit-
2017-6.	
9https://yougov.co.uk/news/2017/03/29/attitudes-brexit-everything-we-know-so-far/	
10 	http://whatukthinks.org/eu/questions/if-a-second-eu-referendum-were-held-today-how-
would-you-vote/	
11	In	 the	 case	 of	 a	 reform	versus	 the	 status	 quo,	 a	 qualified	majority	 can	 be	 used	 instead	 of	 a	
simple	one,	raising	the	issue	of	how	to	choose	the	threshold	that	determines	the	acceptance	of	a	
reform.	This	 issue	 is	 typically	 tackled	 in	a	constitution	and	has	been	 investigated	 theoretically	
from	different	perspectives	contrary	to	the	other	issues	raised	in	the	text.	
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positive,	this	would	have	forced	more	discussion	and	public	deliberation	on	the	Brexit	program,	
and	presumably	a	more	concrete	proposal.	Gersbach,	Mamageishvili	and	Tejada	(2017)	propose	
two-rounds	votes,	in	which	a	(randomly	drawn)	sample	of	voters	votes	in	the	first	round	and	the	
remaining	 population	 in	 the	 second.	 They	 argue	 that	 such	 a	 procedure	may	 help	 solving	 low	
turnout	due	to	costly	participation.	It	might	also	help	raising	voters’	concerns	thereby	increasing	
their	search	for	information.		
	
What	type	of	issues	can	be	solved	by	a	referendum	and	who	can	initiate	a	referendum?		
Are	there	better	systems	than	referendums	to	decide	on	the	splitting	or	merging	of	areas?	Who	
should	decide	on	initiating	such	a	referendum?	The	huge	discrepancy	in	the	rules	governing	the	
use	 of	 a	 referendum	across	Western	 countries	 explains	 the	 large	 difference	 in	 their	 numbers,	
with	Switzerland	and	Italy	standing	apart	due	to	the	possibility	of	‘active’	referendums	initiated	
by	citizens	(Setälä	1999).	Peter	(2016)	empirically	studies	 the	 interaction	between	the	type	of	
referendum	 and	 the	 turnout	 in	 representative	 elections.	 She	 shows	 that	 the	 turnout	 in	
representative	elections	tends	to	increase	when	citizens	can	initiate	referendums	but	not	when	
only	 politicians	 can	 initiate	 them.	 This	 suggests	 investigating	 thoroughly	 the	 rules	 governing	
referendums	in	conjunction	with	the	other	elections	taking	place	in	a	country.	
	
More	generally	a	promising	route	for	social	choice	theory	would	be	to	analyze	the	architecture	
of	the	set	of	voting	rules	governing	a	 jurisdiction.	This	would	fill	an	important	gap	since	social	
choice	theory	has	so	far	focused	on	the	choice	of	a	single	voting	rule.		
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